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Abstract 
This paper develops a matching model à la Pissarides (2000) in order to explain a basic 
fact of housing markets: price dispersion. The variance in house prices is basically due 
to both the ex-ante heterogeneity of the parties (i.e., bargaining power, tastes, 
asymmetric information) and the search costs of buyers and sellers. In fact, sellers and 
buyers spend time and money before concluding the deal. Furthermore, the house 
price is substantially determined by bargaining between the parties. These factors 
affect the selling price and lead to price dispersion. This simple theoretical model is 
able to take these distinctive features of the housing markets into account. 
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1. Introduction 
Price dispersion (or volatility) refers to the phenomenon of selling the same product in 
near locations at the same time but at different prices. Although price dispersion 
research is more commonly found in studies of non-durable consumption goods,
1
 price 
dispersion studies on durable and re-saleable goods such as real estate are also 
growing rapidly (Read, 1991; Gabriel et al., 1992; Baharad and Eden, 2004; Leung et al., 
2006; Yiu et al., 2005, 2006, 2008; and Wong et al., 2006, 2007). Real estate is in fact 
the most important durable consumption good and one of the most important asset 
for most household portfolios (Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). Furthermore, its 
decentralized market makes it possible to observe the dispersion of prices directly, 
since most transactions of real estate come from re-sales between individual buyers 
and sellers (transactions in the housing markets are in fact dominated by a second-
hand market). Hence, it should not be surprising that price dispersion can also exist in 
the housing market (Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). 
According to the literature, the variance in house prices cannot be attributed 
completely to the heterogeneous nature of real estate. In fact, it is widely recognised 
that a significant part of house price dispersion is basically due to the ex-ante 
heterogeneity of buyers and sellers (i.e., bargaining power, tastes, asymmetric 
information) and their sustained search costs (see e.g. Maury and Tripier, 2010). 
Indeed, sellers and buyers spend time and money (for advertising vacancies and 
making the effort to visit the greatest number of houses) before concluding the deal. 
Furthermore, the house price is substantially determined by bargaining between the 
parties.
2
 These factors affect the selling price and lead to price dispersion, since for 
different bargaining powers and search costs the selling price will be different. 
Recently, from a theoretical point of view, there has been much focus on formulising 
the housing market through the use of labour market search and matching models 
(see e.g. Wheaton, 1990; Albrecht et al., 2007; Caplin and Leahy, 2008; Diaz and Jerez, 
2009; Maury and Tripier, 2010; Genesove and Han, 2010; Lisi, 2011). It has, in fact, 
been acknowledged that housing markets clear not only through price but also 
                                                 
1
 A detailed literature review on price dispersion can be found in Baye et al. (2006). 
2
 A major drawback of the hedonic house price theory is that bargaining has no impact on price because 
this theory assumes perfect competition (Quan and Quigley, 1991; Habito et al., 2010; Harding et al., 
2003a; Harding et al., 2003b; Cotteleer and Gardebroek, 2006). Search frictions and the bargaining 
power of the parties rationalise market non-clearing even in the presence of flexible prices. 
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through the time that a buyer and a seller spend on the market. Consequently, the 
search and matching approach is completely consistent even with this type of market. 
The main aim of this paper is to develop a search and matching model à la Pissarides 
(2000) for the housing market that explains price dispersion. In particular, we develop 
a decentralised long-run equilibrium model with ex-ante heterogeneous buyers and 
sellers, based on both the bargaining and the costly search activity that characterises 
the housing market. The proposed work takes the distinctive features of the 
considered market into account, where the formal distinction between buyer and 
seller becomes very subtle. In the model, in fact, a seller can become a buyer and vice 
versa. Indeed, most houses are bought by those who already own one, and most 
houses are sold by those wanting to buy another house (Janssen et al., 1994); indeed, 
buyers today are potential sellers tomorrow (Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). 
In this model, price dispersion comes from two sources: first, the bargaining power of 
the parties, since different bargaining powers lead to different selling prices for two 
similar houses; second, the search costs of sellers and buyers, since the ex-ante 
heterogeneity of the parties implies different search costs and thus individuals obtain 
different values from a conclusive transaction. Obviously, an increase in the bargaining 
power of the seller (buyer) increases (decreases) the selling price. Furthermore, we 
find that an increase in the buyer’s search cost (i.e. the search effort) increases the 
selling price, as does an increase in the seller’s search cost (advertising vacancies). This 
latter result is not completely intuitive. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the housing market 
matching model; while section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
2.1 The hypotheses of the model 
The market of reference is the homeownership market rather than the rental market. 
In this way, if a contract is legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to 
return to the circumstances preceding the bill of sale, unless a new and distinct 
contractual relationship is set up. In matching model jargon this means that the 
destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller match does not exist. 
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The economy is populated by N  types of sellers (which we indicate with N1,...,i = ) 
and by M  types of buyers (which we indicate with M1,...,j = ). “Type” refers to the 
economic rather than social or personal characteristics of the individual. We indicate 
with 
is  a measure of sellers of type i  and with jb  a measure of buyers of type j . 
Hence, we can think of ∑ = Ss
i
 and ∑ = Bb
i
 as measures of the stock of sellers and 
buyers in the economy, respectively. Sellers hold 2H ≥  houses of which 1H −  are on 
the market, i.e. vacancies ( v ) are simply given by ( ) 0S1Hv >⋅−= , thus assuming a 
vacancy rate permanently positive (as in Wheaton, 1990). It is therefore possible that a 
buyer of type j  can become a seller of type i , and that a seller of type i  can become a 
buyer of type j . 
The expected values of a vacant house (V ) and of buying a house ( B ) are given by: 3 
( ) [ ]VPθqarV i −⋅+−=                             [1] 
( ) [ ]PBxθgerB j −−⋅+−=                             [2] 
where 
B
v
θ ≡  is the housing market tightness from the sellers’ standpoint,4  while ( )θq  
and ( )θg  are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of filling a vacant house and 
of finding/buying a home. The popular hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the 
matching function is adopted (see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). 
Hence, the properties of these functions are straightforward: ( ) 0θq' <  and ( ) 0θg' > .5 
The terms 
ia  and je  represent, respectively, the costs sustained by sellers of type i  
for the advertisement of vacancies and the effort (in monetary terms) made by buyers 
of type j  to find and visit the largest possible number of houses. If a contract is 
stipulated, the buyer of type j  gets a benefit x  from the property (abandoning the 
home searching value) and pays the sale price P  to the seller of type i  (who abandons 
the value of finding another buyer). As in Habito et al. (2010), the buyer’s benefit x  is 
a positive function of housing characteristics, i.e. it does not depend on the buyer’s 
type. 
                                                 
3
 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the future at the rate r . 
As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the stationary state. 
4
 By definition, markets with frictions require that: ∞<< θ0 . 
5
 Standard technical assumptions are assumed: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ θglimθqlim θ0θ , and 
( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim θ0θ == ∞→→ . 
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2.2 Equilibrium 
The endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously at equilibrium are 
market tightness (θ ) and sale price ( P ). 
The customary long-term equilibrium condition, namely the “zero-profit” or “free-
entry” condition, normally used in the matching models (see Pissarides, 2000) yields 
the first key relationship of the model, in which market tensions are a positive function 
of price. In fact, using the condition 0V =  in [1], we obtain: 
( )θq
P
ai
=                               [3] 
with 0
P
θ
>
∂
∂
 since ( ) 0θq' < . In short, if the price increases, more sellers will stand in 
the market; hence, it will be more difficult to fill the vacant houses. Consequently, 
fewer vacancies will be on the market. 
The (generalised) Nash bargaining solution, usually used for decentralised markets, 
allows the sale price P  to be obtained through the optimal subdivision of surplus (S ) 
deriving from a successful match:
 6
 
( ) ( )
43421321
buyer of gain  capitalseller of gain  capital
PBxVPS −−+−=  
BxS −=⇒                   [4] 
The price is obtained by solving the following optimisation condition: 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )PBxγ1
γ
P
PBxVP argmaxP
i
i
γ1γ ii
−−⋅
−
=⇒
−−⋅−=
−
 
where 
iγ  is the bargaining power of sellers of type i . Knowing that 
( ) ( ) P
γ
γ1
PBx
i
i
⋅
−
=−− , eventually we get: 
( )BxγP i −⋅= ( )( ) ( )i
ji
γ1θgr
erxγ
P
−⋅+
+⋅
=⇒
                          
[5] 
Equation [5] is none other than the hedonic price function of the model. In fact, the 
selling price depends positively on the buyer’s benefit x , which in turn depends 
positively on the housing characteristics. 
                                                 
6
 Entering into a contractual agreement obviously implies that 0S > , i.e. Bx > , θ∀ . This realistic 
condition ensures that the price is positive. 
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Since ( ) 0θg' > , as market tensions increase, the sale price decreases; hence, we 
obtain the second key relationship of the model: 0
θ
P
<
∂
∂
. In short, if the tightness 
increases, the effect of the well-know congestion externalities on the demand side (see 
Pissarides, 2000) will lower the selling price. 
Finally, it is straightforward to obtain from [3] that when P  tends to zero (infinity), θ  
tends to zero (infinity), as ( )θq  tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the 
negative slope of [5] and the fact that price is always positive, only one long term 
equilibrium deriving from the intersection of the two curves exists in the model (see 
point A in Figure 1). 
========== Figure 1 about here (now at the end) ========== 
 
2.3 Comparative statics and price dispersion 
From [5], the selling price crucially depends on the bargaining power of the seller. In 
fact, 0P0γ i =⇒→ , and 
r
e
xP1γ
j
i +=⇒→ . Since the price can never be negative 
or null, we assume that 1γ0 i ≤< . 
Furthermore, the selling price also depends on the search costs of buyers and sellers. 
In particular, from [5] it is straightforward to obtain that an increase in the search 
effort of buyers (
je ) increases the selling price. This is an intuitive result. However, a 
partially counter-intuitive result regards the effect of advertising vacancies on the 
selling price. In fact, an increase in 
ia  decreases market tightness, which in turn 
increases the selling price (see Figure 2). In short, an increase in the seller’s search cost 
also leads to an increase in the selling price. 
========== Figure 2 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Instead, the impact of interest rate (which might be considered an indicator of 
uncertainty) on the selling price is a priori ambiguous and depends on: (i) the search 
effort of buyers; (ii) the bargaining power of sellers; (iii) the buyer’s benefit; (iv) the 
market tightness. 
Finally, we consider two similar houses, A and B, which give the same benefit: 
BA xx = . 
In this case, price dispersion in the model comes from: 
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a) The bargaining power of sellers (
iγ ): different bargaining powers lead to different 
selling price; 
b) The search costs of sellers (
ia ) and buyers ( je ): in fact, since matching occurs 
between a seller of type i  and a buyer of type j , different pairs lead to different 
search costs, which in turn imply different selling prices. 
 
2.4 Closing the model 
In order to close the model in a very simple manner, we normalise the population in 
the housing market to the unit, i.e. BS1 += . As a result, using the definitions of 
equilibrium tightness ( *θθ = ) and vacancies, we obtain the stock of sellers, buyers, 
and the “natural” vacancy rate: 
*θ1H
*θ
S
+−
=                  [6] 
*θ1H
1H
B
+−
−
=                  [7] 
( )
*θ1H
*θ1H
v
+−
⋅−
=                  [8] 
The “natural” vacancy rate is the optimal share of houses for sale on the market that 
prevails in long term equilibrium at which sellers make no economic profits (Arnott 
and Igarashi, 2000; McDonald, 2000). 
 
3. Conclusions 
This paper develops a matching model à la Pissarides (2000) in order to explain a basic 
fact of housing markets: price dispersion. The variance in house prices is basically due 
to both the ex-ante heterogeneity of the parties (bargaining power, tastes, asymmetric 
information) and the search costs of buyers and sellers. In fact, sellers and buyers 
spend time and money (for advertising vacancies and making the effort to visit the 
greatest number of house) before concluding the deal. Furthermore, the house price is 
substantially determined by a deal between the parties. These factors affect the selling 
price and lead to price dispersion. This simple theoretical model is able to take these 
distinctive features of the housing markets into account. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Increase in the search costs of sellers (advertising vacancies) 
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